Adventitious agents and smallpox vaccine in strategic national stockpile. by Murphy, Frederick A & Osburn, Bennie I
UC Davis
UC Davis Previously Published Works
Title
Adventitious agents and smallpox vaccine in strategic national stockpile.
Permalink
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/4sr6k097
Journal
Emerging Infectious Diseases, 11(7)
ISSN
1080-6040
Authors
Murphy, Frederick
Osburn, Bennie
Publication Date
2005-07-01
DOI
10.3201/eid1107.050277
 
Peer reviewed
eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library
University of California
In keeping with current standards, we urge that old
smallpox vaccines that were made in animal skin and are
still a key part of our strategic national stockpile be tested
for adventitious infectious agents. The advisory especially
applies to viruses that have the potential for zoonotic trans-
mission to human vaccine recipients.
As we studied recent papers on the manufacture andtesting of new smallpox vaccine stocks produced for
biodefense purposes, we were surprised that the largest
part of our national vaccine stockpile, the Wyeth vaccine
Dryvax produced in 1980–1982 and the Connaught (now
Aventis-Pasteur) vaccine Wetvax produced in the 1950s,
has never been scrutinized by modern methods. Of partic-
ular concern is the fact that these stocks have never been
subjected to testing for adventitious agents, whereas a new
vaccine intended to supplement the existing stockpile has
been thoroughly tested (1). Testing of these old stocks met
the standards of the day. However, if these old vaccines are
to be considered valid parts of our national stockpile we
should expect not only continuing testing of potency and
sterility but also testing for adventitious agents with meth-
ods that reflect the standards of today. 
This is not to say that the finding of adventitious agents
must result in removal of these vaccine stocks. That issue
must be a matter for formal risk analysis and consideration
by the same experts who review data on new vaccines
(e.g., the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices
of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention) and by
officials of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
However, as greater concern emerges about the potential
pathogenicity of infectious agents that might be present in
old vaccine stocks, prudence dictates caution and testing. 
Such concerns are amplified by the memory of how
these old smallpox vaccines were made. Such vaccines
were made in the skin of calves and sheep, and seeds and
stocks were passaged in tissues of calves, sheep, and rab-
bits (especially used for seed lot production). Equally
important is the fact that for many decades preceding the
development of standardized manufacturing methods in
the 20th century, the vaccine virus (vaccinia virus) was
propagated by serial passages in animals without precise
knowledge of the passage history and without use of a seed
lot system that stabilized passage level. This uncontrolled
system could have allowed amplification of any passenger
viruses and could have increased the possibility of unto-
ward changes in their genetic makeup. In addition, since
the crude manufacturing methods (Figure) allowed direct
contact of the materials harvested from animals with
human operators, possibilities existed for contamination of
the resulting product with pathogenic human viruses. It
was not uncommon practice before the widespread accept-
ance of vaccine manufacture in animals (at the end of the
19th century) to passage vaccinia virus arm-to-arm
between humans (2). Standardized methods for manufac-
ture in animal skin were not initiated until 1925. 
Such concerns are further amplified by infectious
agents that are targeted by modern vaccine testing proto-
cols. When materials of animal skin origin are used, such
agents are Brucella spp., Mycobacterium spp., Bacillus
anthracis, Clostridium spp., and other bacteria and fungi.
Old stocks of vaccine were tested for microbes, and the
presence of specific pathogenic species was the basis for
rejection of vaccine lots. The specifications for approval of
dermal vaccines produced in calves and sheep allowed for
the presence of a low concentration of nonpathogenic
bacteria and fungi. 
However, the dermal vaccines produced from the 1950s
to the 1980s and currently in the national stockpile were
not tested for mycoplasma or viruses. In the case of vac-
cines manufactured in calves, the agents of concern
include several bovine viruses (bovine viral diarrhea virus,
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bovine parainfluenza virus type 3, bovine respiratory syn-
cytial virus, bovine adenoviruses, bovine parvovirus[es],
bovine herpesvirus 1 [infectious bovine rhinotracheitis
virus], other bovine herpesviruses, bovine reovirus[es],
rabies virus, bluetongue viruses, bovine polyoma virus,
bovine circovirus, Cache Valley virus, and orthopoxvirus-
es other than vaccinia [such as cowpox]). We were unable
to find a comprehensive list of possible adventitious agents
when ovine materials are used, as is the case for the Lister
strain smallpox vaccine produced in Europe and old vac-
cine stocks held by some European countries for biologic
defense. Sheep harbor several members of the same virus
groups found in cattle, but they also carry other viruses.
Rabbits were sometimes used for intermediate passaging
of vaccinia virus stocks and for seed virus production, par-
ticularly in Europe. Possible rabbit viruses that could con-
taminate vaccinia stocks include endogenous retroviruses,
papillomavirus, herpesviruses, and leporipoxviruses.
Because of research and development of specific
pathogen-free swine as special organ and tissue donors for
human xenotransplantation over the past decade, the list of
possible adventitious agents in materials derived from
swine is quite comprehensive (3). 
When materials of human origin are used, adventitious
agents include HIV-1 and HIV-2; human T cell lymphotrop-
ic virus type I (HTLV-I) and HTLV-II; hepatitis A, B, and C
viruses; human cytomegalovirus; Epstein Barr virus; human
herpesviruses 6, 7, and 8; human parvovirus B19; reovirus-
es; polyoma (JC/BK) viruses; 5V40 virus; human coron-
aviruses; human papillomaviruses; influenza A, B, and C
viruses; various human enteroviruses; human parainfluenza
viruses; and human respiratory syncytial virus. 
As mentioned, there is a risk that a human virus could
have been introduced into smallpox vaccine seed or vac-
cine stocks during manufacturing, since barrier methods
such as those currently used in all phases of vaccine pro-
duction were not in place. Although the ability of such
human viruses to be propagated in subsequent vaccine lots
is uncertain, many human viruses are capable of replicat-
ing in animal cells. 
When materials from any animal source are used, spe-
cial consideration is given to exogenous and endogenous
retroviruses (e.g., bovine immunodeficiency virus), lym-
phocytic choriomeningitis virus, adenoassociated viruses,
minute virus of mice, and other viruses that are notorious
contaminants. However, these special considerations fail
to include many infectious agents that should raise con-
cern. However, for old smallpox vaccine stocks, it is
enough to question whether any of the infectious agents
specifically cited in FDA and European Commission regu-
lations, recommendations, and guidelines are present. 
Current regulations, recommendations, and guidelines
on testing for adventitious microbial and viral agents from
various national and international agencies require nonspe-
cific screening and relevant specific tests. Regulations
requiring tests for mycoplasma and viruses came into
effect long after old stocks of smallpox vaccine were man-
ufactured. Nonspecific screening tests include classic cul-
ture tests for bacteria and fungi (sterility tests), special
culture and animal tests for Mycobacterium spp., cell cul-
ture tests for the presence of certain cytocidal viruses (by
inoculation of and blind passage in Vero, MRC-5, HeLa,
RK, and A9 cells with observations for cytopathology and
tests for hemadsorption and hemagglutination at the end of
the culture period), and animal inoculation tests for certain
viruses (suckling and adult mice, guinea pigs, and embry-
onated hen eggs). Electron microscopy is often used to
find adventitious agents in cell culture banks. 
In the United States, federal regulations specify that
products of bovine origin (such as virus preparations, cell
lysates, cultured cells, or other reagents) intended for use
in the production of human biologics be tested for the pres-
ence of specific bovine viruses in accordance with 9 C.F.R.
113.53. Specific tests for adventitious infectious agents are
conducted using various polymerase chain reaction
(PCR)– and immunochemical–based assays. The extraor-
dinary sensitivity of these assays has served to raise the bar
of expectation of test veracity, while improving practicali-
ty and containing costs. In many cases, these assays have
been validated, that is, proof-tested using salted vaccine
and vaccine substrate materials. Since companies exist that
conduct these specific tests for vaccine developers and
manufacturers, such testing on old smallpox vaccine
Adventitious Agents and Smallpox Vaccine
Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 11, No. 7, July 2005 1087
Figure. Freeze-dried (smallpox) vaccine being prepared from virus
grown on the skin of a calf. The calf is lying on a grate on a table
and is bound to the table. Two men in white coverups, 1 of whom
has a surgical mask on his face, are performing a procedure on
the calf (scarification and introduction of vaccinia virus into the
scarified areas). From the record of the US National Library of
Medicine; old negative no. 83-168. WHO/11683 SEARO,
Smallpox, Bangladesh, SM 5-1 980. (Photograph attributed to J.
Mohr, 1980?)
stocks is eminently feasible. The new cell culture-based
smallpox vaccine has been tested by using these methods
(1). However, considering more advanced PCR-based tests
for unknown or unrecognized adventitious agents (e.g.,
representational difference analysis, use of various degen-
erate primers) would require extensive research and add
substantially to overall costs. For the purpose at hand, we
are suggesting only that the battery of specific tests now
used on all modern vaccine materials be used. 
Concerns about the possible presence of adventitious
agents in old smallpox vaccine stocks are amplified further
by current concerns about prions and the zoonotic potential
of prion diseases. Old smallpox vaccine stocks might not be
contaminated by bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE)
prions, but Lister vaccine stocks that were produced in
sheep and vaccine seeds that had been passaged in sheep
could be contaminated by scrapie prions. Regulations and
guidelines for modern vaccines state that all materials used
must come from BSE-free regions but say nothing about
scrapie-free regional status. Testing of old vaccines for pri-
ons is beyond the sensitivity of any present in vitro prion
test, but this issue should be considered (4). 
Since no problems related to contamination have been
recognized during the long history of smallpox vaccines,
or during the intensified program to eradicate smallpox,
one might argue that little risk for humans is posed from
adventitious agents in old stocks of vaccine. However, it is
unlikely that low-incidence untoward events temporally
related to adventitious agents have been recognized. It is
equally unlikely that diseases that appeared at long inter-
vals after smallpox vaccination would have been associat-
ed with the vaccine. Furthermore, since most smallpox
vaccine was used in children, we may have less data on its
use in adults than we would want. Of note is the recent
observation that myopericarditis is a relatively common
serious adverse event following smallpox vaccination, but
that this complication was not recognized during the era of
routine vaccination (5). 
Today, the senior guiding document for manufacturers
of first-generation smallpox vaccines, i.e., vaccines pro-
duced in animal skin, is the World Health Organization
(WHO) Recommendations for Production and Control of
Smallpox Vaccine, revised 2003 (6). A definitive version
of this document will be published in the WHO Technical
Report Series (the working version is available from
http://www.who.intlbiologicals/Smallpox_final.pdf). FDA
documents on this subject are much more general and say
little or nothing about adventitious agents (7). The WHO
document represents continuation of a series that started in
1956. Several points from the 2003 WHO document (6)
are of particular interest here (the chosen points are not
meant to be comprehensive or reflect the overall sense of
this document). 
First, adventitious agent testing for viruses in vaccine
virus seeds and product intermediates is complicated and
might give ambiguous results. Therefore, newer, more spe-
cific tests are planned for the future. Second, testing for
viral adventitious agents of animal skin vaccine should
take into consideration the source country of the animals.
Guidelines for transmissible spongiform encephalopathy
testing should be followed. Third, the concentration of
nonpathogenic bacteria and fungi in vaccines produced in
animal skin may be very difficult to validate, and consis-
tent sterility of the finished product may be difficult to
achieve. The use of a nonsterile final product may be jus-
tified since smallpox vaccine is administered by scarifica-
tion rather than by intramuscular or intravenous
inoculation, and because its use over many years did not
cause problems. Fourth, the general method for testing a
live viral vaccine strain for contaminating viruses is to
neutralize the vaccine virus and test for adventitious virus-
es both in vitro and in vivo. However, it is recognized that
vaccinia virus is very difficult to neutralize to the extent
required for such studies. Additional testing such as nucle-
ic acid amplification techniques for specified viruses and
reverse transcriptase assays for retroviruses should com-
plement nonspecific tests. Fifth, in preparing master seed
lots, procedures should be used that help remove extrane-
ous agents. Since removal or inactivation of microbial con-
taminants is unlikely at any downstream level, the
presence of extraneous agents in seed lots during the pro-
duction process must be avoided. Sixth, the absence of
specific human pathogens should be confirmed by addi-
tional testing, e.g., bacterial and fungal cultures, virus cul-
ture, PCR testing for viral agents.
Taken together, these points from the 2003 WHO doc-
ument make it clear that members of the WHO Expert
Committee on Biological Standardization had difficulty
dealing with the exceptional problems posed by the first-
generation smallpox vaccines, i.e., vaccines produced in
animal skin. Their difficulty in producing guidelines also
pertained to old lots of such vaccines, such as those that are
part of the US and European strategic stockpiles. This
seemed most obvious regarding testing for adventitious
agents. The limits of such testing seem clear, but so are the
practicalities. Standard testing for adventitious agents is
practicable and would provide important evidence for risk-
benefit considerations if or when old vaccines are used in
an emergency situation. Time will eventually obviate such
considerations as modern smallpox vaccines replace old
vaccines in national stockpiles, but for the present we see
the WHO document as another basis for suggesting com-
prehensive testing of old vaccines. 
Since old smallpox vaccine stocks have been in the
public domain for many years, we would expect that com-
prehensive testing would be funded by the same public
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agency (the US Department of Health and Human
Services) that intends to distribute the vaccines should the
need arise. We believe that the testing should be fully
transparent, that is, fully open to public scrutiny.
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